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Abstract: 
The extraordinary growth of the East Asian economies during the last fifty 
years has drawn attention of the economists worldwide.  This paper provides a 
commentary on this epic story. This paper explores the reasons for the 
extraordinary growth and analysis specific changes which have occurred in 
income inequality and labour market institutions during this time span. One 
main conclusion of the paper that contrary to commonly held belief  that the 
globalization and nature of technological progress has been the main cause of 
increased income inequality in the period after East Asian crises. We conclude 
that country specific factors were at least as important, if not more so, in this 
respect. Analysis shows that in addition to varying pattern of income inequality 
which has not been observed by other commentators have also been major 
changes in labour market indicators, including unionization and collective 
bargaining, employment protection, and minimum and real wages.  Last part of 
the paper discusses policy implications.     
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Almost Steady East Asian Rise: 
Implications for Labour Markets and Income Distribution 
 
I. Introduction 
This paper examines changes in income distribution and labour market 
indicators in the context of highly successful East Asian development during 
the last half century.  The initial four countries involved in this process, namely 
South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong achieved exceptional long 
term growth during the period 1970-2013. Despite this excellent performance, 
they nevertheless faced severe difficulties during the Asian crisis of 1997–2000, 
but they recovered much more quickly than had been anticipated. In the late 
1990s in the wake of the crisis, leading American policy makers argued that the 
state directed capitalism of the East Asian variety was unviable in the long run 
and the Asian crisis was a tragedy waiting to happen. However the countries 
concerned recovered extremely fast1.They were obliged to follow the IMF 
prescriptions in the immediate aftermath of the crises but soon re-established 
their economies on a different but more secure path. 
The story so far is well known. If Hong Kong and Singapore are put aside as 
being special cases of small city states, this narrative applies best of all to the 
two East Asian NICs – Korea and Taiwan.  In this chapter, in addition to the 
reasons for their fast economic growth, we wish to explore the main changes 
which have occurred in two specific spheres a) income equality and b) labour 
market indicators (together with their interactions) in these as well as in other 
                                                          
1
See further Alan Greenspan’s testimony to a US Congressional Committee (October, 2008) and Larry Summers 
(May, 2000) 
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main Asia-Pacific economies. We start with the East Asian model and comment 
on its outstanding performance during the period 1970 to 1997. The model, as 
is generally acknowledged, was successful not only in terms of growth of per 
capita income but also importantly, in terms of reduced income inequality. 
However, the model does not seem to have escaped unscathed from the Asian 
economic crisis at the end of the 20thcentury. Although it helped the recovery 
process in leading East Asian countries, during and after the crisis this was 
accompanied by a rise in income inequality and relatively poor performance of 
labour market indicators. In the last two aspects the performance of Korea and 
Taiwan was no better than that of many other developing and developed 
countries.  
As we shall see the most important feature of the East Asian model was the 
role of the state in economic development. This is a hugely controversial 
subject and will be fully discussed in the following sections. These sections will 
also consider the question of income distribution and labour market indicators, 
providing a complete array of statistical data on these and related subjects for 
the relevant countries. The purpose of these quantitative exercises will be to 
establish stylized facts in these fields (growth of per capita income, income 
inequality and labour market indicators) for various countries and country 
groupings, and later attempt to explain the more important of the observed 
tendencies. For reasons of space, and within limitations of the terms of this 
paper, only a few of the main economic issues that emerge in the course of the 
analysis of this paper will be fully discussed. The final section will sum up the 
main conclusions of the paper and examine their implications for economic 
policy in Asia and in the world economy.  
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II. Changes in Income Levels and in Inequality of Income Distribution: South 
Korea and Taiwan 1970 - 2013 
First we briefly document the extraordinary economic achievement of East 
Asian countries by taking South Korea and Taiwan as examples. In the 1960s, 
South Korea was a poor undeveloped economy. More importantly, it was 
thought to have very meager prospects for future development. The US 
Congress passed a resolution during that period which suggested that South 
Korea should not be given any developmental aid but simply humanitarian 
aid2. Yet we see that from a per capita income level of US$ 80 in the mid-
1960s, South Korea joined the ranks of developed countries by the 1990s and 
its per capita income had climbed to over US$20, 000. Similarly, Taiwan’s per 
capita income rose from US$ 700 in 1960s to US$ 20,000 in 20123.  The 
subsequent growth of Korea and Taiwan, notwithstanding the Asian crisis, has 
been of roughly similar magnitude. For the sake of completeness we suggest 
that Hong Kong and Singapore also did very well, but as mentioned above, we 
will not consider their cases here further because of the limited replicability of 
the experience of these small states to the typical agrarian economies of the 
developing world. The growth experience of other Asian countries will be 
examined in the next section together with other related data.   
III. Quantitative indicators of East Asian Miracle 
Having looked briefly at the performance of the fast growing East Asian 
countries we now provide statistical data on economic performance of other 
countries. We present here a statistical profile of the Asian countries with 
                                                          
2
See further Helen Hughes( 1988; 1995; 2003) 
3
 Lawrence Lau(2002); IMF (2012) 
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Figure 1a.   Average annual % growth of GDP by regions: 1962-
2012
 
Source: World Bank(2012):World Development Indicators. 
respect to the following variables: a) long-term changes in per capita income, 
b) data on income inequality both before and after the Asian crisis, c) similarly 
changes in labour market indicators in the wake of the Asian crisis. We also 
give data on income equality and labour market indicators in the period before 
the Asian crisis. We then give similar figures for the post-crisis period and 
establish that income distribution became more unequal, and the labour 
market indicators deteriorated. 
However reader may like to note that if he/she is not interested in detailed 
statistics, he/she can skip the long section and goes straight to the conclusions 
which are summarized at the end of this section.  
3.1 This section will report changes in per-capita income for the second, third 
and fourth generation of Asian countries. However it will also report differences 
in the growth rates of per-capita income for selected decades for Asia, Latin 
America, Africa. 
The East Asian economies with an impressive annual growth of 7.2% over the 
past half a century 
from 1960 to 2012, 
has eclipsed the 
growth in other 
regions of world 
(Figure 1a). The 
average growth rate 
of the East Asian 
countries was more 
than double of the 
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Figure1b. Average annual %growth of GDP across Asian countries 
Source: World Bank(2012):World Development Indicators. 
growth for the world as a whole as well as for the sub-Saharan economies. The 
region continues to maintain its edge over other regions during three sub-
periods as well. East Asian economies are followed by the South Asian regions, 
which was growing at the same pace as Latin American economies during 
1960-94. However, during the last two decades since 1995 the growth in South 
Asian countries surged further ahead of growth in most economies including 
the Middle East and North America, and Latin American and Caribbean 
economies.  
 
The success story of the Asian economies followed a ‘Flying Geese’ pattern 
with Japan as the leading goose. It was followed by the first generation tigers, 
South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, recording average 8.5% 
growth a long period 1960-1994(figure 1b) compared with 3.8% growth for the 
world as a whole. The four Asian tiger economies were followed by other 
economies in keeping with Flying Geese pattern of structural changes as the 
more advanced countries lost their comparative advantage in cheaper goods. 
The less advanced countries were able to produce them because of their lower 
wages. This pattern of development seems to have dominated the East Asian 
and the South Asian countries in particular.  
Recently third 
generation fast 
growing 
economies 
Cambodia, Loaos, 
Mangolia and 
Vietnam also 
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joined the Fyling Geese pattern of high economic growth. With dramatic high 
growth, China and India two very large economies of Asia, also recorded 
historically unprecedented high growth during the last two decades.   
 
3.2 This section will explore further the income inequality profile of Asian 
countries including cubic regressions.  The outstanding feature of inequality in 
table-1 is that the Gini coefficient either remained the same or rose up slightly 
in some countries up to early 1980s. However income inequality in Japan, 
before taxes and transfers, has experienced a greater increase. The Gini 
coefficient increased from 35.5% during early 1970s to 40.3% during 1995 and 
to 48.8% during 2009. Similar dramatic rise in Gini coefficient were recorded in 
Hong Kong and Singapore, whereas in 1970-1990 income inequality fell in 
some countries notably Singapore and South Korea. It rose slightly in other 
countries. On an average Gini coefficient fell 0.1% annually in the first 
generation economies during 1970-1990. The coefficient rose by 0.8% per 
annum in these countries between 1991 and 2010. 
In the second generation economies the table reveals dramatic contrast with 
the high performing East Asian economies. There was general decrease in the 
Gini coefficient for the second generation economies. An important point 
which is not much commented in the literature is that the Gini coefficient fell 
at an average rate of 0.2% in 1970-1990 and by 0.5% in 1991-2010. Received 
wisdom is that all the first and second generation economies recorded an 
increase in Gini Coefficient between 1998 and 2010. However the correct 
picture in that the second generation economies recorded an overall fall in Gini 
coefficient in period 1996-2010. There was also an increase in Gini coefficient 
in many third generation economies as well as in India and China. Inequality 
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rose dramatically n China from 27.9% during 1970 to 32.7% in 1980 to 37.9% in 
1990 and to 47.5% in 2012.  
It is important to note that some of the observed changes in table-1 are due to 
substantive factors affecting various economies; other than due to purely 
inter-country differences in the definition used to measure inequality. For 
example, India’s better performance than that of China in this respect in the 
entire region is the fact that Indian figures are based on consumption 
expenditure whereas for most of other countries per capita income is the basis 
of calculations.  
The overall pattern of changing income distribution is further corroborated by 
the information on the relative share of the richest 20% to the poorest 20% in 
the income distribution in Table-2. The 20/20 rich/poor gap was comparatively 
stable during 1970-1990 but widened thereafter. Comparatively income 
inequalities widened more sharply at the top and the bottom than in middle 
income classes, as growth on top-bottom quintile ratio rose at higher pace 
than in term of Gini ratio. The widening of the rich-poor gap occurred more 
rapidly in the first generation economies than what was captured by the Gini- 
an overall measure of inequality. In the second generation economies, the rich-
poor gap declined but it is still very large compared with the rich-poor gap in 
the first generation economies. Gap is comparatively small in rest of the Asia 
Pacific countries with exception of China, Sri Lanka and Fiji where it is catching 
up with the second generation countries. For all countries taken together, 
inequalities at top and bottom have widened more sharply than at the middle, 
as the top-bottom quintile ratio widened at double the annual growth of 0.55% 
compared with average annual growth of 0.28% of Gini during 1991-2010. Gini 
and 20/20 rich/poor ratio suggest the increasing polarization of income 
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distribution at the top and bottom of the income distribution in most of the 
Asia pacific countries in general and East Asian first generation economies, 
China and Sri Lanka in particular. 
Do the changing income inequalities validate the Kuznet’s inverted U-curve 
hypothesis? It is not valid for the long term changes in income distribution in 
South Korea. Evidence suggests that inequality in terms of Gini coefficient first 
rose from 0.271 in 1965 to 0.320 in 1978, declined thereafter to 0.283 in 1997,  
 
 
 
 
 
rose to 0.316 in 1998 and peaked to 0.321 in 1999 (in the wake of the East 
Asian crisis) declined a little bit thereafter but again began to rise and reached 
0.345 in 2008 (Figure 2a and 2b). Contrary to the inverted U-curve hypothesis, 
the 35 years of income distribution pattern seem to follow a cubic form 
hypothesis. The inverted U-curve has raised its tail in the wake of the Asian 
financial crisis of 1998 and subsequent to global economic crisis of mid-2000s. 
In fact the econometric results also reject the inverted U-curve relationship 
and validate the cubic functional relationship between income inequalities and 
per capita income in Korea4 (Appendix-2).  
                                                          
4
 See estimated regression in Appendix-2. The best results are obtained by including the cubic term in the 
regression rather than  linear and a square terms. R
2
 increases from 0.45 to 0.55 on including cubic per capita 
income term in the quadratic Gini-per capita regression.  
Figure-2a  Income Gini in Korea: 1965-2010 
 
Source:Kwack & Lee(2007) and KOSIS (www.kosis.kr) 
Figure-2b Top10% to bottom10% income ratio 
 
Source: Same as Figure 2a 
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Figure 3   %age  Share of wages in GDP, 1994-2012  
 
Source: AMECO 
 
3.3 It may be noted that some analyst prefer to regard labour market indicator 
as another measure of income inequality. This section will comment on the 
labour market 
indicators for a few 
Asian countries before 
and after the crisis. We 
will report whatever 
data we have been 
able to collect on this 
subject. 
Recent sharp rise in 
income inequalities are accompanied by significant changes in the labour 
markets. Following liberalization, globalization and rapid technological 
changes, and weakening of the labour market institutions (LMIs) adversely 
affected the low wage earners. Consequently, share of wages (adjusted to 
compensation) in gross domestic product (GDP) declined almost in all 
countries since the financial crises in general and 2005 in particular (figure-3). 
In fact the decline in wages in East Asia was much sharp than occurred in 15 
countries of European Union (EU-15) and United States. Accordingly, income 
distribution shifted from labour to capital and finance, leading to widening gap 
between the wage earners and the rest. 
Evidence from Korea shows the lopsided growth of households and corporate 
incomes during the post liberalization regime. While the growth in national 
income was equitably shared between the household and the corporate 
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sectors as both were growing around 8.1% for both the sectors over pre-crises 
1975-97 period. However during the post-crises 1997-2010 period, while 
income growth for the household sector decelerated to 2.4% whereas it 
accelerated sharply to 16.4% for the corporate sector(figure-4). Same is more 
or less true about rest of the East Asian countries as is evident from the steep 
rise in income share of the richest 10% in Japan, Korea and Singapore. The 
share of the richest 10% was almost stable and around 30% during 1980-95, 
increased sharply to more than 40% in these countries by 2010. The rise was 
shortly disrupted during 2005 but was again back to same rising track in the 
very next year(figure 5). 
 
 
 
  We consider further the question of real wages of workers in Asia Pacific 
countries. The results reported in Table-4. The table indicates that average real 
wage growth between 1984-1994 was 9.4% per annum. It fell to 2.0% in 1995-
2011 and to 1.6% during 2005-2011.  
Figure-4 Growth of household & corporate sectors 
income in Korea: 1975-2010 
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Figure-5    %share in income of the top 10%  
25
28
31
34
37
40
43
46
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
4
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
8
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
8
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
2
%
sh
a
re
 o
f 
ri
ch
 1
0
%
 i
n
 i
n
co
m
e
Singapore Japan Korea
 
Source:OECD data base 
14 
 
The dramatic decline in real wages after 1995 is evident from the Table. The 
situation of continuum fall in real wages is not reversed till 2011. China and 
India are exceptions to the phenomenon despite slowdown in their economic 
growth in the post-global crises. It may be suggested that in India, 
implementation of assured 100 days employment at the minimum wage rate 
to the rural poor under MGNREGA and its overall impact on the labour market 
seems to have mainly contributed in maintaining the wages.   
The outstanding feature of table 4 is the figure for China; which shows 
relatively little deceleration in growth of real wages in the period after 1995. 
Real wages in China rose at 12.7% per annum during 1984-1995, declined 
marginally to 11.4% pa during 1995-2011 but recovered to 12.1% pa during 
2006-2011. The figure may be contrasted with those from other countries in 
table-3. The striking wage rises in China need comment. The explanation for 
the phenomenon does not seem to lie in economic reasons but rather a 
comment on political economy of Chinese development. During the last 10 
years or more the Chinese leadership was involved in the reform of the 
contract system of labour. This includes workers rights including a number of 
features of the western labour laws. The leadership felt that it would not be 
wise to reduce the growth of real wages at the time of such politically 
sensitivity (see further Park, 2013).             
Wage deceleration apart, the last two decades also witnessed widening of 
wage inequalities. The 90-10 (top to bottom percentile) male wage differential 
in South Korea first declined from 4.1 in 1984 to 3.2 in 1990 but rose to 3.7 in 
2000 and to 4.7 in 2008-second highest growth of wage inequality next to 
United states among the 12 OECD countries (Machin and Reenen, 2010). 
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Figure6.Average annual growth on minimum wages 
 
Source:  ILO data set 
 
 
What happened to the labour market institutions during the recent setbacks to 
the labour wages? Information in figure-6 on growth of real minimum wages 
shows that at least stagnant minimum wages is not the culprit. With exception 
of three countries, Philippines, Mongolia, and Myanmar, minimum wages 
received upward revision in rest of the Asia Pacific countries. Prima facie the 
set back to labour earnings cannot be attributed to stagnant level of minimum 
floor wages to the workers. 
However, there always remain 
a scope for practical side of 
the story, de-jure minimum 
wage and de-facto minimum 
wages. In fact brings out that 
the Korean labour market is 
afflicted with its duality-core 
and periphery.  While the core 
constitute workers in public sector and large corporations, mostly unionized, 
enjoys high level of employment protection and covered under the social 
safety nets(Grubb, Lee and Tergeist, 2007). In contrast, periphery of Korean 
labour market mainly constitutes irregular workers in SMEs and/or services 
sector with low job security and mostly excluded from protection mechanisms 
and social safety nets. Therefore, Korean experience shows that with 
inadequate coverage and poorly implemented and complied with legislations, 
it may not have the desired impact on the low-wage earners. Despite relative 
increase in the real minimum wage rate, share of the workers earning below 
the minimum wage in Korea has increased from below 2.0%  in 2000 to about 
12% (around 2 million workers) in 2010 (Cheon et.al; 2013, p85).  Effective 
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Figure-7   Union density in selected countries 
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Source:  ILO data set 
 
 
 
labour union can play a watchdog role in enforcement of not only the 
minimum wages and other labour market legislations but also in centralized 
wage bargaining and protecting workers against market shocks.  
Changes in unionization of workers in the Asian countries, however are not 
very encouraging and presents a mixed picture across countries (figure-7). The 
magnitude of union density varies considerably across countries from a low of 
2.1% in Thailand, 3.2% in Singapore to 37.3 % in Taiwan, 41.9% in India and 
78.6% in China. Furthermore, labour unions suffered serious reverses in 
Singapore, Korea, Philippines and 
Thailand where their density has 
been reduced numerically to less 
than 10 percent.  Evidence from 
econometric analysis for 21 OECD 
countries, Checchi and Garcia-
Peňalosa (2008) found union 
density having strong negative 
correlation with union density. No 
specific pattern is discernable 
across Asian countries as increasing inequality in Hong Kong and Taiwan and 
China co-exist with rising union density. Nonetheless, widening income 
inequalities weakening of labour unions is matter of serious concern in some 
East Asian countries where numerically they stand marginalized. De-
unionization of workers apart, evidence compiled by the OECD indicate similar 
weakening of the employment protection legislations. For example, index of 
strictness of employment protection-individual and collective dismissal- of the 
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Figure 9   %age of low pay workers 
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Figure 8.  Collective bargaining  coverage 
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regular contracts for South Korea declined from 3.04 in 1990 to 2.37 in 1998 
and for Japan it declined from 1.70 in 1990 to 1.37 in 20075. 
Figure-8 shows per cent of the wage employees covered under the collective 
agreements.Limited selectiveinformation availablein this contextreveals the 
poor status of collective 
bargaining in these countries vis-
à-vis Australiaand Canada.   
Again no common pattern of the 
income inequality and collective 
bargaining is visible. 
Comparatively Singapore exhibit 
both relatively higher and rising 
inequality along with increasing collective bargaining.  
 
The indicators of labour market institutions (LMIs) across Asian countries 
signify the poor status and a move towards their further weakening overtime 
in most of the countries. The 
evidence so far is inadequate to 
correlate the LMI dynamics 
with the rising income 
inequalities in these countries. 
Nevertheless, developments on 
some other accounts along 
with the LMIs contributed to 
deterioration of labour markets in these countries.  One such outcome is the 
                                                          
5
 OECD data base http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=EPL_R 
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Figure10  Social  expenditure as % of GDP 
 
Source: ADB(2013): Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific 
2013 
 
rising proportion of the low pay workers in these counties during the post 
crises period (figure-9). Korea is a specific case having experienced a significant 
rise in low pay workers from 18.7% during late nineties to 20.5% during earlier 
half of the new millennium to 22.4% during its last half. Proportion of low pay 
workers exhibits a big gap among the local Chinese and immigrant Chinese 
(from other than present work places). This is basically due their differential 
labour market regulations for local Chinese and immigrant Chinese workers. 
 
It is now well accepted that public spending on social protection are key to 
protection of vulnerable segments of the society and hence in equitable 
growth of the economies. Nakamura (2013) argued that social spending by 
governments is a complex 
process determined by the 
nature ruling parties, 
incentives for provisioning 
of social services, political 
market imperfections, 
preferences of the median 
voters, and maturity of the 
democracy. Japan is odd-
man-odd with exceptionally very social spending that constitutes 18% of its 
GDP(figure 10). Very high level of social protection is one of the key factors 
that enabled Japan to contain rising market income based inequalities by 31% 
in 2010. On the other hand it can be argued that the government for its political 
reasons felt obliged to raise the social expenditure. Plausibly, part of this 
pressure is to be from the Breton Woods institutions.  With exceptions of Japan 
and Korea, other Asian countries has allocated very low amount on the social 
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expenditure. Furthermore with exception of Japan, Korea and China, social 
expenditure in other Asian countries declined sharply overtime. Deterioration 
in income distribution in some of these countries in general and that of low 
income vulnerable in particular may be partly due to dwindling public 
allocations to social expenditure in Asia. Reason for decline in social 
expenditure in countries other than Japan and South Korea is an important 
question which will not be taken up in this paper.  
 
Section conclusion: 
After a long journey through statistical data on income inequality, labour 
market indicators and changes in these variables overtime, we are in a position 
to sum up the main conclusions of this section. 
 
1. Our investigations confirm some points, already reached by a number of 
scholars; our results however contradict other contributions. The results 
confirm that there was a relatively little deterioration in income distribution 
in Asian countries in the period before the Asian crises but there was an 
almost universal rise in income inequalities in the post Asian crises period. 
The results are sensitive to the time period chosen for study, the definition 
of income inequality and other attributes of the income distribution system 
and the labour market. 
 
2. Recent changes in income distribution across Asian countries do not 
support the Kuznet’s inverted-U curve relationship between inequality and 
level of per capita income. On the contrary, long term income distribution 
in South Korea depicts cubic relationship.   Detailed econometric analysis 
for South Korean income distribution arrived at similar conclusion. The 
20 
 
reason for choosing South Korea for this exercise is that it is the focus of 
this paper and has also available long time series information.  
 
3. The deterioration in Income inequalities has mainly occurred at top and the 
bottom of income distribution in the relevant counties in the post Asian 
crises period. Widening rich-poor gap increased polarization of income 
distribution in most of the Asia pacific countries, particularly among the 
East Asian first generation economies, China and Sri Lanka. This finding 
supports the Palma’s suggestion of polarization of income distribution in 
the recent past.   
 
4. The second generation East Asian high performing economies present a 
contrast with the high performing first generation economies from that 
region. In contrast to rise in inequalities in the later group of countries, 
income inequalities declined in the former economies even during the past 
two decades. Our evidence does not support the general perception that 
the globalization and nature of technical progress among other factors has 
been the main causes of increasing income inequalities. However there is 
clearly role for country specific factors since the second generation 
economies were also subjected to the similar causes but did not engender 
similar outcomes. It is important to recall that income distribution in the 
four fast first generation economies followed a particular path, which does 
not seems to be repeated by the next generation economies. This has 
obvious policy implications, which will be taken up in the concluding 
section.  
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5. Recent rising income inequalities are accompanied by significant changes in 
the labour markets of the Asian economies. De-unionization of workers, low 
collective bargaining, weakening of employment protection and social 
protection mechanisms are common characteristics of the labour markets 
in most of the Asian countries. Weakening of LMIs accompanied by sharp 
deceleration in real wages, widening wage gaps at the top and the bottom 
of wage distribution and rise in proportion of low paid workers in most of 
these economies. Even significant rise in minimum wages proved ineffective 
to stem deterioration in labour conditions.   
 
 
IV. Favourable initial conditions and role of the State in the East Asian 
Miracle 
(a) Favourable initial conditions: Four Asian tiger economies in general and 
South Korea and Taiwan in particular aftermath of the World War II was poor 
and highly volatile both economically and politically. Nonetheless, certain 
policy initiatives undertaken during early 1950s and certain favourable 
conditions prevailing initially contributed immensely for subsequent take-off 
and spectacular high and equitable growth. These include sweeping land 
reforms, higher initial education, and massive economic and military 
aid/assistance. For example, to begin with in 1945, Korean agrarian structure 
was highly polarized with 48.6% landless households, 2.9% big farmers owing 
64% of land, and 65% land area under tenancy cultivation. The land reforms 
based on the principal of “Compensated forfeiture and non-free 
distribution”wiped out the landlords as a class, provided land rights to 1.6 
million erstwhile tenants and by 1956, 51% farmers owned 65% land with 
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average size of 1.1 hectares (Putzel, 2000, pp 5-6). Bonds issued to landlords 
as compensation for forfeiture were used for industrial investment and many 
of them switched to manufacturing. There is now wider consensus that the 
reforms created a stable political and economic environment by earning 
support for the authoritarian regime, laid the foundation for subsequent 
success of agricultural productivity programmes and hence raising farm 
income, promoted high demand for and fast rise in middle school enrolment 
in the country side, augmented supply of educated skilled labour force to 
expanding industries, and expansion of the domestic market for growing 
industries. The reforms led to redistribution of wealth and lower income 
inequalities.  
 
With mere 22% literacy in 1945, education expanded rapidly in Korea and by 
1970 school enrollment rate exceeding 90 percent. In this context, many other 
Asian countries like India are still way behind what Korea already attained in 
1970. Like the primary enrolment, subsequently similar trends witnessed the 
middle, high schools and tertiary education. Expanding education not only met 
the ever expanding demand of trained educated workers in industry but also 
paved the way for upward mobility of the workers on income ladder and 
spatial mobility to Seoul and other urban agglomerations and hence in 
containing the income inequalities. 
Massive inflow of foreign assistance/aid, mainly from United States, was the 
third important initial condition that prepared a strong foundation for the later 
take-off of both the Korean and Taiwanese economies.  Between 1946-1975, 
total US aid obligations  for economic and military aid to South Korea and 
Taiwan amounted US$69.15 billion and US$41.81billion (in 2011 US dollar) 
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respectively (Gray, 2013, p.18). Foreign resources financed foreign exchange 
deficit and facilitated imports, stabilized prices, provided additional revenue to 
governments for investment and building infrastructure without putting 
additional tax burden and inhibiting production incentives, build confidence to 
local and foreign investors, financed and facilitated technology transfer. For 
example, between 1953 and 1960, about 74% of South Korean investment was 
financed by foreign aid, foreign aid constituted about 80% of commodity 
import from 1955-1960 and 17% of Korean GNP in 1957 (Frank et.al. 1975, p12). 
(b) Role of the State in the East Asian Miracle 
It is today widely accepted that the state played a major role in achieving the 
fast growth of the East Asian economy. However, this acceptance is a 
comparatively recent development. Neoclassical economists, notably those 
from the Bretton Woods institutions misread East Asian history and denied the 
role of Government in creating outstanding developmental success. As late as 
1988 Balassa(op. cit)argued, “The above remarks are not meant to deny the 
role of government in the economic life of East Asia. But, apart from the 
promotion of shipbuilding and steel in Korea and a few strategic industries in 
Taiwan, the principal contribution of government in the Far Eastern NICs has 
been to create a modern infrastructure, to provide a stable incentive system, 
and to ensure that government bureaucracy will help rather than hinder 
exports”. This position of the orthodox economists became increasingly 
unsustainable in the light of new research which acknowledges the deep 
involvement ofthe state in all spheres of the economy. However it is necessary 
to point out that there is a revisionist school of historians which again deny 
that state led industrial policy had been successful in East Asian countries. 
Therefore, controversy which seems to have been settled about a decade ago 
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concerning the subject has resurfaced.However, it has not been a particularly 
serious discussion until now. 
The basic East Asian model consists of state industrial policy and a strategic 
openness to the world economy, rather than a close integration. The 
competition policy was used in countries like Korea and Japan to enhance 
industrial investment instead of lowering prices for consumers. The state both 
encouraged competition for expanding industries and discouraged it for 
declining industries. The East Asian model consists of an increasing 
combination of cooperation and competition in the implementation of 
industrial policy. Korea may be thought of as being an example of the kind of 
transformation which the East Asian model brought in its wake. Other 
countries, specifically Taiwan and Singapore, essentially followedbroadly state 
directed industrialization and achieved extremely successful development. In 
this context it must not be forgotten that the leading exemplar country was 
Japan. During the period 1950-1963, when Japan was more like a developing 
economy than was the case subsequently, the Japanese economy achieved 
historically unprecedented growth during this time span. Its manufacturing 
production rose at a phenomenal rate of 13 % per annum (pa),itsGDP at 10 % 
pa and its share of world export of manufacturing rose by a huge 10 
percentage point. However, during the last 20 years the Japanese economy has 
beenstagnant. Whether this is inevitable in an East Asian model of the kind 
followed by Japan is a mute question. It will only be answered by the future 
course of economic history.  
Japan introduced the ‘Flying Geese’ model to the East Asian countries, which 
involved continuous upgrading of Japanese production and its space being 
taken by countries which had lower wages. The same kind of model appears to 
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be applicable to Korea itself today. The Korean foreign direct investment (FDI) 
in Vietnam and North Korea is exceeding the net FDI inflow into Korea. 
Implications of the phenomenon remained to be explored. The 
Japaneseexperiment appears to have worked reasonably well. The question is 
whether the Korean Flying Geese will be as successful from the Korean point of 
view. 
There has been some convergence of views on the broad description of the 
basic East Asian model. There is general agreement amongst scholars on the 
following specific points:  
1. A close relationship exists between government and business where the 
government does nothing without consulting business and vice versa. 
2. Many interventions are carried out through a system of “administrative 
guidance” rather than through formal legislation. 
3. The relationship between the corporation and the financial system in 
countries like Japan and Korea has also been very different from that of 
the US and the UK.The former countries have followed, for example, the 
so-called main bank system which involves long-term relationships 
between the corporations and the main banks. This enables Japanese or 
Korean managers to take a long-term view in their investment decisions. 
The managers are not constrained by the threat of hostile take-overs on 
stock markets as is the case in the Anglo-Saxon countries. 
4. There are differences in the internal organization of East Asian 
corporations compared with those of the US and the UK. The former 
involve co-operative relationships between management and labour, 
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epitomized by the system of lifetime employment. This implies 
considerable imperfections in the labour market. 
5. As for the competition in the product markets, such competition is not 
regarded by the East Asian authorities as an unalloyed good. Unlike in 
countries like the US, economic philosophy in the East Asian countries 
does not accept the dictum that “more competition is better”. The 
governments in these countries have taken the view that, from the 
perspective of promoting investment and technical change, the optimal 
degree of competition is not perfect or maximum competition.The 
governments have therefore purposefully managed and guided 
competition; it has been encouraged but also restricted in a number of 
ways.6 
6. The firm level model which is used in South Korea shares many 
characteristics which is more akin to typical organizational firm in the 
developing world rather than with advanced countries including Japan.  
There has been one important area where Korean economy has not succeeded 
since the Asian crisis. This is the income distribution question. It indicates that 
the income inequalities which were falling during 1970-1995started to rise in 
the following period. As graph-1 shows, the Korean rise in income inequalities 
during the period 1998 to 2010 was relativelysmaller than other countries.  
From the above facts and the narrative, the following analytical points emerge. 
First, there is the question of why inequality rose in the post-Asian crisis 
period. It will be appreciated that there are a number of causes why inequality 
                                                          
6
For a fuller discussion, see Amsden and Singh (1994). 
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could have increased. The discussion of this issue will necessarily brief the 
important conclusion from general discussion in the last section and this one is 
that although inequality rose in East Asian countries during and after the Asian 
crisis, the rise was relatively small and it is a moot question whether the policy 
makers should be concerned with such a small rise in income inequality. There 
is much more room for meaningful and useful action by the developing country 
governments if they were to go further than simply to reduce inequality. The 
truth of the matter is that the fast growing Asian economies have proved that 
they are able to have sustained economic growth for long periods of time. 
Below, we shall summarise some of the facts that we learn from the data for 
these fast growing East Asian countries. 
 
V. Conclusion: 
In conclusion it may be useful to draw attention to another aspect of income 
distribution and growth of the East Asian miracle countries. This is the question 
of wealth distribution. South Korea has been a pioneer in economic growth 
and, as the title of this essay suggests it has achieved an ‘almost steady’ 
growth of income over a fairly long period. There is however still pending the 
question of wealth distribution. As is well known that large corporations, the 
Chaebols, have played a central role is South Korea’s prosperity. Scholars of 
South Korea estimate that it posses one of the most concentrated industrial 
structures in the world, whether one consider firms from rich or poor 
countries. 
 
It is important to know that since the democratization movement has gathered 
pace, there have been growing protests by aggrieved citizens against the 
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alleged abuse of power by the Korean multinational conglomerates. 
Implications of the unequal distribution of wealth and that of income suggest 
that the government taxation system and other measures must have 
powerfully affected post tax income distribution to make it relatively more 
equal. These are however open questions for which we have not enough 
information to draw any firm conclusions. The purpose of this paragraph is not 
to suggest that the Chaebols should be abolished but rather their abuses, if 
any, should be investigated and punished. In our view the Chaebols remain 
central to development of South Koreas economy; they are also important 
elements in the conceptualization of the South Korean developmental state.  
 
Research shows that such firms tend to be more efficient than the 
conglomerates in the developed world. For developing countries they 
spearhead the acquisition of technology from abroad. Developing countries 
wish to follow the Korean developmental path must make themselves aware of 
both the successes and the failures of the path. It is for others to emulate its 
achievements and to avoid failures.  
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Table 1 . Trends in Inequality in selected Asia and Pacific Countries 
 
 Country Year of Gini coefficient   Average annual 
percentage growth 
  Early Early Early Late Early Early Early Late 1970 to 1991 to 
  1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 1990 2010 
Japan                     
income before taxes 1970 1981 1996 2009 35.5 33.4 40.3 48.8 1.4 1.2 
income-after tax and transfers 1970 1980 1994 2010 31.4 31.4 32.3 33.6 0.1 0.3 
First Generation Fast Growing 
economies 
              
Hong Kong 1971 1981 1991 2006 40.9 37.3 45.0 53.3 0.5 1.1 
Singapore 1973 1980 1989 2010 41.0 42.0 39.0 48.0 -0.3 1.0 
South Korea 1970 1982 1992 2010 33.3 35.7 28.4 31.0 -0.7 0.5 
Taiwan 1970 1980 1990 2010 29.4 30.3 30.8 34.2 0.2 0.5 
Average         36.2 36.3 35.8 41.6 -0.1 0.8 
Second Generation Economies                     
Indonesia 1971 1984 1990 2010 43.9 40.4 38.7 35.6 -0.7 -0.4 
Malaysia 1970 1979 1989 2009 50.0 51.0 48.3 46.2 -0.2 -0.2 
Philippines 1971 1985 1989 2009 49.4 46.1 45.7 43.0 -0.4 -0.3 
Thailand 1969 1981 1990 2010 42.6 43.1 48.8 39.4 0.6 -1.1 
Average         46.5 45.2 45.4 41.1 -0.2 -0.5 
                      
Third Generation Economies                      
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Cambodia     1994 2009     38.3 36.0   -0.4 
Vietnam*     2001 2010     42.0 43.3   0.3 
Laos PDR     1992 2008     30.4 36.7   1.2 
Mongolia     1995 2008     33.2 36.5   0.7 
Average             36.0 38.1   0.5 
                      
Other Economies                     
China 1970 1980 1990 2012 27.9 32.7 37.9 47.4 1.5 1.0 
India* 1970 1983 1993 2010 30.4 31.5 32.5 33.9 0.3 0.2 
Pakistan 1970 1979 1990 2005 32.1 36.0 40.7 43.0 1.2 0.4 
Bangladesh 1973 1981 1991 2010 36.9 38.3 30.9 48.2 -0.9 2.5 
Sri Lanka 1970 1981 1991 2010 37.7 43.0 47.0 49.0 1.1 0.2 
Nepal   1984   2010   30.1   32.8   0.3 
Fiji   1977 2003 2009   42.5 46.8 42.8 0.4 -1.5 
Average         37.3 38.5 41.6 43.2 0.2 0.5 
                      
All  20 countries         37.9 38.3 39.2 41.5 0.16 0.28 
                      
Note: * -indicates the gini for the country/year concerned are based on per capita consumption whereas rest are based on 
income.  
Source: WIDER, World Bank Povcal Net data and Deininger and Squire (1996) high quality data 
(http://go.worldbank.org/vvpo9ksjjo) 
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Table 2 . Trends in Inequality in selected Asia and Pacific Countries 
 
          Ratio of the share of Top20% to 
Bottom 20% in income distribution 
Average  annual percentage 
growth  Country Year of 
  Early Early Early Late Early Early Early Late 1970 to 1991 to  
  1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 1990 2010  
Japan                      
income before taxes                      
income-after tax and 
transfers 
1972 1980 1996 2009 6.5 6.3 6.9 7.2 0.2 0.3  
First Generation Fast 
Growing economies 
                     
Hong Kong 1971 1981 1991 2006 9.0 7.5 10.1 18.0 0.6 3.9  
Singapore 1973 1980 1989 1998   7.1 7.1 9.8 0.0 3.6  
South Korea 1970 1982 1992 2010 5.7 6.2 5.7 5.8 0.0 0.1  
Taiwan 1970 1980 1990 2010 4.5 4.2 5.0 6.2 0.5 1.1  
Average         6.4 6.3 7.0 10.0 0.3 2.2  
                       
Second Generation 
Economies 
                     
Indonesia 1970 1980 1990 2011 5.3 5.8 4.6 6.3 -0.7 1.5  
Malaysia 1970 1979 1989 2009 14.1 15.1 11.7 11.3 -1.0 -0.2  
Philippines 1971 1985 1989 2009 15.0 10.0 10.1 8.3 -2.2 -1.0  
Thailand 1969 1981 1990 2010 9.8 11.9 13.8 6.9 1.6 -3.4  
Average         11.1 10.7 10.1 8.2 -0.6 -0.8  
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Third Generation Economies                       
Cambodia     1994 2011     5.8 6.3   0.5  
Vietnam*     1992 2010     5.5 5.9   0.4  
Lao PDR     1992 2008     4.2 5.9   2.1  
Mongolia     1995 2008     4.9 6.2   1.8  
Average             5.1 6.1   1.2  
                       
Other Economies                      
China 1970 1980 1990 2009 4.6 4.6 5.9 10.1 1.2 2.9  
India* 1970 1983 1993 2010 4.5 4.7 4.5 5.0 0.0 0.6  
Pakistan 1970 1979 1991   7.9 10.0 8.7   0.4    
Bangladesh 1973 1981 1992 2010 6.3 6.8 4.1 4.7 -2.2 0.8  
Sri Lanka 1970 1981 1991 2010 6.2 9.1 9.5 12.0 2.1 1.2  
Nepal   1984   2010   4.3   5.0   0.6  
Fiji     2003 2009     12.6 8.0   -7.3  
Average         5.9 6.6 7.5 7.5 -0.1 -0.2  
                       
All  20 countries         7.1 7.6 7.0 7.8 -0.05 0.55  
             
Note:  1.  * -indicates the gini for the country/year concerned are based on per capita consumption whereas rest are based on income.  
           2. **  indicatesfigres for market income whereas rest are for disposable income.     
Source: WIDER, World Bank Povcal Net data and Deininger and Squire (1996) high quality data (http://go.worldbank.org/vvpo9ksjjo) 
            (accessed on 03.09.2013) supplemented by country specific published/unpublished household survey data. 
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Table 3.  Average real wage growth in Asia: 1984-2011 
Country Annual % growth  
1984-1994 1995-2011 2006-2011 
Japan  12.7 -0.1 -0.4 
First generation economies  
Hong Kong  16.0 1.9 0.5 
Singapore  8.5 3.1 1.0 
South Korea  12.1 2.4 -0.3 
Taiwan   0.6  
Average 12.2 2.0 0.4 
Second generation economies  
Indonesia  2.3 3.6 -0.7 
Malaysia 11.9 1.6 1.3 
Philippines  8.2 -3.4 -0.5 
Thailand  7.6 0.3 1.9 
Average 7.5 0.5 0.5 
Other Economies   
China  12.7 11.4 12.1 
India  0.9 1.7 1.5 
Pakistan   1.5 1.9 
Bangladesh  12.7 5.7 3.8 
Sri Lanka   -0.7 -1.7 
Nepal  6.6 3.0 2.6 
Fiji   -0.7  
Average 8.2 3.1 3.4 
All countries 9.4 2.0 1.6 
               Source: ILO data set
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Appendix-1 
Kuznet curve-a critique: 
The Kuznet curve, formulated by Simon Kuznet in the mid-fifties, argues the inverted-U 
shape pattern of inequality in long run process of economic development. With increasing 
economic growth, inequality in personal distribution of income first tends to widens, peaks 
and then diminishes. Kuznets(1955) argued that the processes beneath the inverted-U curve 
lies in the dynamics of dual structure of economies. Inequality in pre-industrial societies is 
low in the beginning but starts rising with shift of population from low-productive 
agriculture to more-productive industrial and more unequal (wages) industrial sector. 
Maturation of economies at higher level of development and public social protection 
mechanisms narrows rural-urban gaps and interpersonal distribution of income inequalities. 
Williamson (1985) emphasized the role of technological change as contributor to different 
rates of skill accumulation and as a cause of earnings inequality. He argued that the 
existence of rising-falling Kuznets curve lies in "dis-equilibrating factor demand forces, which 
tend to augment inequality during early industrialization" and by "equilibrating factor supply 
responses, which tend to produce egalitarian trends during late industrialization" (p. 3). 
Recently, Acemoglu and Robinson (2002) argued that development does not necessarily 
induce a Kuznets curve and put forth political economy explanation of the downturn in the 
inverted-U curve. They emphasized: “capitalist industrialization tends to increase inequality, 
but this inequality contains the seeds of its own destruction, because it induces a change in 
the political regime towards more redistributive system”(p.184). Later on Palma (2011) also 
argued that rather than pure economic factors, political-institutional factors along with the 
nature of political settlement have greater influence on the income distribution.   
Historical evidence from the rich countries, especially from United Kingdom and United 
States, supports the Kuznets curve but only up to 1970 when inequality reached at its lowest 
level. But the post-1970 evidence from advanced economies confounds the Kuznets 
inverted-U curve. Rising income inequalities in 16 of the 20 rich OECD countries between 
mid-1980s and mid-2000s are contrary to the expectations of the Kuznets curve (Milanovic, 
2011). Similarly cross-country data supporting Kuznets Inverted-U curve observed by many 
studies (Ahluwalia, 1976, Ahluwalia, Carter and Chennery, 1979) during 1980s disappeared 
by 2005 (Palma, 2011). On the contrary, from the observed horizontal elliptical shape 
between Gini and log of income for 2005, Palma(2011) concludes that a greater majority of 
the countries in the world have relatively similar income distribution. On basis of graphical 
exposition and regression estimated on data from 135 countries over 1985-2005 period, 
Palma (2011) found that the upward side on the inverted-U have evaporated and income-
inequality distribution manifested in downward side shape only. Cross-sectional evidence 
notwithstanding, debate on the relevance of Kuznets-U curve income-inequality relationship 
is still far away from any definite conclusion as some others still believe its relevance in the 
time-series context (Kanbur, 2011).   
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Appendix-2 
Regression of Gini coefficient of income inequality in South Korea on per capita income and time, 
1965-2012 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent variable-Gini coefficient 
 Regression coefficients  (t-values in parentheses) 
I II III IV V VI 
Per capita 
income (PCY) 
3.666x10-6 
(6.042)* 
3.241x10-6 
(1.153) 
2.350x10-5 
(3.444)* 
   
PCY2  2.363x10-11 
(0.153) 
-2.710x10-9 
(3.132)* 
   
PCY3   1.008x10-13 
(6.04)* 
   
Time    0.002 
(7.017) * 
1.346 x10-3 
(1.483) 
3.494x10-3 
(2.099)** 
Time2     4.112x10-6 
(0.224) 
-7.758x10-4 
(1.790)*** 
Time3      6.516x10-6 
(1.853)*** 
Constant 0.267 
(45.492)* 
0.269 
(27.571)* 
0.234 
(16.788)* 
0.260 
(42.912)* 
0.262 
(27.717)* 
0.245 
(19.260)* 
R2 .045 0.45 0.55 0.52 0.52 0.56 
Number of 
observations 
47 47 47 47 47 47 
Note: *,  ** & *** indicate that value significant statistically at 1, 5 and 10 per cent level of significance for  2-
tailed t-test.  
Source: As table-1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
39 
 
Appendix-3 
Palma ratio 
The Palma is an alternative measure of income inequality based on the work of Gabriel 
Palma(2006). The Palma is defined as ratio of the share of top 10 per cent rich in 
national income to the share of bottom 40 per cent of the poor population. It basically 
addresses to the Gini index’s lesser sensitivity to changes at the top and bottom of 
income distribution and oversensitivity to the changes in the middle of the distribution. 
The index is based on observation that half of the middle income world population have 
acquired half of their respective national income; the rest half of the income is shared 
between the very rich (richest 10 percent) and very poor (poorest 40 percent). The 
share of very rich and very poor varies across countries. The superiority of the Palma 
ratio over Gini coefficient lies in its more intuitive interpretation for stakeholders(policy 
makers and citizens) and its more suitability as policy indicator of the extent on 
inequality and poverty reduction policy (Gabriel,  2006 and 2011, and Cobham and 
Summer, 2013).  
The evidence on the changing inequalities in terms of Palma ratio (table-4) is same as 
seen in case of Gini coefficient (table-1). The coefficient of correlation between the two 
turned is almost perfect, 0.99. Changes in inequality by Palma ratio, however, differ with 
Gini for some countries. For example, inequality in Philippines in terms of Gini 
coefficient declined throughout the 1980-2010 period while the Palma ratio increased 
overtime implying that the Philippines growth redistributed income from very poor 
(bottom 40 percent) to very rich (top 10 percent) in the country. In fact evidence 
suggests that the polices and changes associated with growth processes in the post 
financial crises period in majority (10 out of 16) of the Asian counties for which data is 
available led to polarization of income distribution. The richest 10 percent consolidated 
their position whereas the very poor 40 percent became more poor overtime. The 
polarization of income distribution was more serious in Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand 
and China. There is rapid move towards further polarization in Indonesia, Loa PDR, 
Mongolia and China.   
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Table- Changes in income inequality in selected countries of Asia: Palma Ratio 
Country 
Palma ratio Change (%) pa 
1980 1995 2010 1980-1995 1995-2010 
Indonesia 1.153 1.226 1.486 0.41 1.29 
Malaysia 2.969 2.967 2.627 0.00 -0.81 
Philippines 1.978 2.174 2.183 0.63 0.03 
Thailand 2.464 2.149 1.795 -0.91 -1.19 
Average 2.141 2.129 2.023 -0.04 -0.34 
      
Cambodia  1.736 1.543  -0.78 
Lao PDR  1.169 1.599  2.11 
Mongolia  1.287 1.555  1.27 
Vietnam  1.508 1.489  -0.08 
Average  1.425 1.547  0.55 
      
China 1.049 1.485 2.153 2.35 2.51 
India 1.199 1.186 1.392 -0.07 1.07 
Bangladesh 0.911 1.361 1.272 2.71 -0.45 
Pakistan 1.351 1.085 1.156 -1.45 0.42 
Sri Lanka 1.279 1.494 1.571 1.04 0.34 
Average 1.157 1.322 1.509 0.92 0.88 
      
All countries  1.649 1.625 1.693 -0.10 0.27 
            Source: Cobham and Summer(2013) and own estimates from world Bank data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
